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Abstract
The contribution of this study is two-fold: First, it outlines a conceptual framework on political order; and secondly, it offers
empirical illustrations on the case of Nordic cooperation. Taken together, the article makes a plea for public administration
scholarship in the study of political order. Political order consists of a relatively stable arrangement of institutions that are
fairly formalized and institutionalized. A common political order, moreover, entails that relevant institutions: (i) are fairly
independent of pre-existing institutions; (ii) are relatively integrated and internally cohesive; and (iii) are reasonably able
to influence governance processes within other institutions. The article empirically suggests that Nordic-level institutions
are less likely to act relatively integrated and independently of member-state governments as well as being able to wield
significant influence on public governance processes within member-state institutions.
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1. Introduction
Turbulence within and around public affairs calls for un-
derstanding the conditions for resilient and sustained po-
litical order (Ansell, Trondal, & Ogard, 2016; Fukuyama,
2016; Olsen, 2007; Tamuz & Lewis, 2008). The challenge
of understanding social and political order is enduring
in the social sciences (Elster, 2007; Waldo, 1992) with
continuous disputes over “the legitimate role of demo-
cratic politics in society” and “forms of political associa-
tion” (Olsen, 2016, pp. 1–5). So-called failed states, such
as Syria fairly recently, accentuate the concern for sta-
bile political order. Periods of crisis, like the Covid-19
crisis, have also highlighted the importance of efficient,
resilient and legitimate political order. During historical
periods of stability, by contrast, the significance of polit-
ical order is often taken for granted. During periods of
political deterioration, organized arrangements become
subject to debate and requests for reforms (Fukuyama,
2013; Pepinsky & Walter, 2019; Trondal, 2010). With
an ambition to rediscover the study of Nordic coopera-
tion as well as to advance studies of political order, this
study offers ways to theoretically conceptualize politico-
administrative order in the Nordic region. The contri-
bution is two-fold: First, it outlines a conceptual frame-
work that highlights the administrative dimension of po-
litical order; secondly, merely to illustrate the frame-
work, the article offers empirical illustrations of emer-
gent political order in the European Union (EU) as well
as Nordic cooperation.
Unveiling political order involves studying why such
orders emerge and disappear (e.g., Bartolini, 2005;
Fukuyama, 2013; March & Olsen, 1995; Padgett &
Powell, 2012), their consequences—especially how they
influence policy outcomes (e.g., Olsen, 2007; Orren &
Skowronek, 2004)—and how political order may be the-
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oretically conceptualized (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1987). This
article is particularly interested in the latter. Perhaps un-
surprisingly for institutional building-sites such as the
Nordic cooperative arrangements, the institutional soul
searching is intense. Studies of unsettled and transitional
political orders are, however,much less prominent. Since
the classics in administrative sciences (e.g., Gulick, 1937)
and up to recent studies of public administration (Emery
&Giauque, 2014; Olsen, 2016) the largest focus has been
on the study of settled political orders. One notable ex-
ception has been a vibrant literature on the study of in-
ternational public administrations (IPAs; e.g., Barnett &
Finnemore, 2004; Bauer, Beyerlein, Ege, Knill, & Trondal,
2019; Bauer & Trondal, 2015; Trondal, 2016; Trondal &
Bauer, 2017; Trondal, Marcussen, Larsson, & Veggeland,
2010). International bureaucracies constitute a distinct
and increasingly important feature of both global gov-
ernance studies and public administration scholarship.
The IPA literature has advanced these types of studies
by offering a ‘public administration’ approach. This en-
tails that the study of international governmental or-
ganizations has been somehow ‘normalized,’ i.e., that
a public administration turn comes to characterize in-
ternational governmental organizations studies (Trondal,
2007). Studies have shown that IPAs profoundly in-
fluence global governance (Biermann & Siebenhüner,
2009), transformpower distributions across levels of gov-
ernment (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009), and change the con-
duct of domestic public sector governance (Keohane,
Macedo, & Moravcsik, 2009). Moreover, IPAs are called
upon to cope with ever more wicked and unruly public
problems. Turbulence inworld politics is partly caused by
turbulent politico-administrative systems, partly by tur-
bulent environments, and partly by how organizations
and their environments poorly match—thus creating tur-
bulence of scale. IPAs may be seen as one coping mech-
anism in an ever more turbulent global scene (Ansell
et al., 2016).
Crisis and disintegration have faced ´grand-theories´
of European integration such as neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism with conceptual and explanatory
difficulties, while mid-range theories such as institu-
tionalisms have fared comparatively better (Riddervold,
Trondal, & Newsome, 2020). Yet, most discussions of the-
oretical rehabilitation in the literature have focused on
the role of grand-theories, leaving mid-range accounts
less discussed. One reason might be that big theoretical
ideas may explain general trends more adequately than
particularities of cases (e.g., Boin & Lodge, 2016). This
article aims to fill the void of mid-range theorizing by ap-
plying a mid-range institutionalist approach to conceptu-
ality examine political order.
A common political order arguably consists of a
relatively stable arrangement of institutions that are
fairly formalized and institutionalized. A common politi-
cal order arguably requires that relevant institutions are:
(i) fairly independent of pre-existing institutions; (ii) rel-
atively integrated and internally cohesive; and (iii) rea-
sonably able to influence governance processes within
other institutions. In sum, a political order is charac-
terized as a fairly independent, integrated and influen-
tial set of institutions that allocate “authority, power,
information, responsibility, and accountability” (Olsen,
2016, p. 3). However, one caveat needs to be taken into
account: An ‘order’ does not suggest institutions that
are perfectly integrated, coordinated and impeccably in-
dependent. They are often imperfectly so (Trondal &
Bauer, 2017).
The research question of this study is to what ex-
tent Nordic cooperation rises into some kind of ’com-
mon’ order. To illustrate: In a Nordic context a com-
mon order lets us infer that Nordic institutions are able
to act relatively independently of member-state govern-
ments, be fairly integrated internally (within and among
the Nordic institutions), and able to exert influence on
the policy processes of member-state institutions—thus
ultimately challenging the politico-administrative auton-
omy of the constituent states. This article, however, sug-
gests that Nordic-level institutions (notably the Nordic
Council of Ministers and its Secretariat) in practice are
less likely to act relatively integrated and independently
of member-state governments and less likely to wield sig-
nificant influence on public governance processes within
the member-state institutions. In the case of Nordic co-
operation, most primary administrative capacities are lo-
cated within national ministries and agencies, and rela-
tively few at the ´Nordic level´.Member-state administra-
tions are subsequently likely to primarily influence policy
agendas and policy implementation.
The article is presented as follows: The next section
outlines a research agenda by outlining a public admin-
istration framework; the subsequent sections suggest
conceptual dimensions that might be used for empiri-
cal study.
2. A Research Agenda
Studies of state-building demonstrate that the emer-
gence of political orders involves balancing acts between
creating central politico-administrative capacities and
institutions safeguarding local independence (Rokkan,
1999). Recent literaturemoreover demonstrates that the
rise of politico-administrative systems at EU-level trans-
forms policy processes at national level. For example,
studies show that the European Commission profoundly
biases power distributions across levels of government
and circumvents domestic democratic governance pro-
cesses (e.g., Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2016).
We have seen three subsequent waves of studies
on political order, and this article serves as part of the
third wave. Briefly sketched, the first wave largely saw
domestic political orders as sealed systems of gover-
nance in which phenomena external to the nation-state
were conceptually treated as exogenous epiphenomena
(Wilson, 1989). Studies of public administration was thus
largely circumscribed to the study of domestic govern-
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ing systems (e.g., Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). A sec-
ond wave of studies directed attention to how inter-
national institutions—such as IPAs—contributed to the
transformation of national political order. These studies
illuminated processes of transformation from an inher-
ent Westphalian towards a post-Westphalian order char-
acterized by a restructuring of political authority (e.g.,
Bartolini, 2005; Egeberg, 2006) towards institutionalized
multilevel governance (MLG; Ansell & Di Palma, 2004;
Hooghe & Marks, 2001). This second surge of litera-
ture both included the research programme on MLG by
Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe as well the first wave
of literature on multilevel administration (MLA I, see
Section 4). From the 1960s, studies of administrative
integration emerged focusing on the integration of do-
mestic and international administrative bodies. Studies
of administrative integration argued that the domestic-
international distinction was conceptually and empiri-
cally fuzzy (Rosenau, 1966). The “descriptions of the
[EU] Community as ‘above,’ ‘alongside’ or ‘outside’ the
member states were seen as oversimplifications” (Pag,
1987, p. 446), stressing ‘bureaucratic inter-penetration’
between member-state and EU administrative bodies
(Cassese, 1987; Rosenau, 1966). More recently, the inter-
dependencies of political orders has perhaps been most
successfully captured by the MLG approach (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001). The European political order is thus seen
as a polymorphic system that integrates governance lev-
els into a complex marble cake consisting of a patchwork
of separate but interconnected political institutions at
different levels of authority (e.g., Bulmer, 2008, p. 173).
This article subscribes to a third wave of study by
highlighting the administrative basis for political order
and the organizational dimension of public governance
(MLA II, see Section 4). This field of study has been par-
ticularly interested in understanding European admin-
istrative institution-building (Egeberg, 2006; Rittberger
& Wonka, 2011) and more recently the organizational
foundation of a multilevel European administrative sys-
tem (Curtin & Egeberg, 2008; Egeberg, 2010; Egeberg &
Trondal, 2009). The European administrative system has
subsequently been pictured as a “multilevel and nested
network administration, where administrative bodies at
different levels of government are linked together in the
performance of tasks” (Hofmann & Turk, 2006, p. 583).
In short, this third wave of literature has been seen as
representing a ‘public administration turn’ in the study
of political order (Trondal, 2007).
3. Public Administration and the Study of
Political Order
In an effort to conceptualize Nordic cooperation in partic-
ular and to capture basic aspects of political order in gen-
eral (Painter&Peters, 2010, p. 6;Waldo, 1992, p. 37), this
article suggests how the study of public administration
may be helpful to conceptually frame political order. One
enduring challenge in conceptualizing political order is to
establish theoretically powerful and empirically helpful
categories that capture essential and enduring character-
istics (e.g., Fukuyama, 2016, p. 222). Our starting assump-
tion is that adequate analytical categories should both
offer more empirical variation between than within cate-
gories as well as be generalizable across time and space.
Examples of less meaningful categories are those treat-
ing institutions as sui generis. Such concepts are not gen-
eralizable across time and space and easily prevent the
accumulation of general knowledge. One recent exam-
ple is new intergovernmentalism picturing EU agencies
as “de novo bodies” (Bickerton, 2012).
Our approach puts the administrative dimension of
political order conceptually center stage. There are at
least two key reasons for doing so. The first is that ad-
ministrations represent the action capacities for polit-
ical orders. Without administrative institutions, public
policies will not be initiated, drafted, nor implemented
(Fukuyama, 2013). Moreover, the well-being of citizens
is shown to be nurtured by societies administered by
‘impartial’ public bureaucracies (Rothstein, 2012). So, ad-
ministrative capacities are central for making ‘good’ and
‘living’ political orders (March & Olsen, 1989). Secondly,
the administrative dimension is by and large neglected
in studies of political order (e.g., Rokkan, 1999). In EU
studies the administrative dimension has been largely
neglected by leading theoretical approaches, such as
social constructivism (Checkel, 2005) and intergovern-
mentalism (Moravcsik, 1998). In effect, advancing a
public administration approach to the study of polit-
ical order, this article supports a thread of thought
from neo-functionalist literature which argued that bu-
reaucratic integration of administrative elites was vital
for European integration (Haas, 1958, p. 16; Niemann,
2006, p. 280). Moreover, despite focusing on the ad-
ministrative dimensions of political order, the role of
public administration is not analyzed in isolation—as
an “intellectual wasteland” (Bobrow, Eulau, Landau,
Jones, & Axelrod, 1977, p. 421)—but as requisite ca-
pacities that mobilize ‘bias’ in the making of public pol-
icy (Schattschneider, 1975). A public administration ap-
proach to political order formation is thus also a theory
of political organization (Olsen, 2016).
Notwithstanding developments in the study of the
EU administrative system (Bauer & Trondal, 2015;
Trondal & Bauer, 2017), contemporary public adminis-
tration scholarship faces one major challenge. Public ad-
ministration literature has devoted limited attention to
broader discussions on how administrations affect the
growth and decline of political order: This literature has
for instance not payed much attention to how chang-
ing structuring of the state—e.g., agencification and net-
working of agencies—coincide with forms of multilevel
administrative governance (Danielsen & Yesilkagit, 2014;
Egeberg, 2006; Fukuyama, 2013; Raadschelders, 2011;
Trondal, 2014). It has not sufficiently studied how orga-
nizing public policy at one level of governance may influ-
ence ways of making public policy across levels of gover-
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nance (Egeberg & Trondal, 2016). The next section sug-
gests how administrative science may provide a concep-
tual toolkit to the study of political order.
4. Conceptual Dimensions of Multilevel Administration
The EU has served as an important research labora-
tory for understanding political order (e.g., Olsen, 2007).
To conceptualize Nordic cooperation, this article builds
conceptually on this scholarly laboratory. One main
thread in this literature has been on themultilevel nature
of the EU polity (Marks, 1993; Piattoni, 2010). According
to Trondal and Bauer (2017), a ‘level’ refers to the distinct
and independent institutions, rules, procedures and per-
sonnel. Amultilevel order thus encompasses distinct and
independent platforms that connect these elements at
national level with parallel elements at the level above.
This platform of elements consists of a puzzling mix
of institutional autonomy and institutional interdepen-
dence across levels of governance. It contains institutions
that act relatively independently from domestic govern-
ments as well as enjoy institutional interdependencies
or ties between the same institutions (see March, 1999).
Recognized by the MLG literature (Hooghe & Marks,
2001), studying this mix of institutional autonomy and in-
terdependencies is vital in order to adequately capture
the multilevel character of Nordic cooperation.
Moreover, despite contemporary literature having
seen European multilevel order as centered on its ad-
ministrative dimension (Trondal & Peters, 2013), we have
seen twowaves ofMLA literatures (hereby termedMLA I
and MLA II). This study draws attention to the second
wave of MLA II literature:
• MLA I: The first surge of MLA studies was partic-
ularly interested in the convergence of adminis-
trative systems and the convergences of public
policies between EU member-states (Olsen, 2007).
MLA was thus measured by its outcome—that is if
administrative forms, practices and ways of doing
things became more similar across the member-
states. This field of study emerged from the lit-
erature of comparative government and compar-
ative public administration, examining the roots
of common administrative systems (Knill, 2001;
Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011) and manage-
ment practices (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011).
‘MLA’ was conceived of as the “convergence on
a common European model” (Olsen, 2003, p. 506).
In this thematic issue, Lægreid and Rykkja (2020)
reflect this approach by their study of adminis-
trative cooperation among Nordic ministries and
agencies, focusing on the emergence of conver-
gent administrative policies among Nordic states.
• MLA II: A more recent line of research conceives
of MLA as featuring novel institutional constella-
tions and configurations. This line of research is in-
terested in examining and understanding patterns
or processes of integration of public administra-
tion institutions—not their outcomes (e.g., Benz,
2015). Such studies have been preoccupied with
both understanding processes of European ad-
ministrative capacity-building (e.g., Rittberger &
Wonka, 2011) and processes of multilevel adminis-
trative governance of ministerial departments and
public agencies (Curtin & Egeberg, 2008; Egeberg,
2010; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).
Following MLA II, three analytical dimensions have been
suggested for analysis in this literature: institutional inde-
pendence, influence, and integration (Trondal & Bauer,
2017). A multilevel administrative system is thus char-
acterized by the emergence of institutions that are rel-
atively coherent, independent, and able to influence
other institutions. Each of these items is shortly dis-
cussed in the following sub-sections.
4.1. Independence
Political order formation involves continuous tensions
between administrative dependence and independence
within and between administrative systems (Trondal,
2017). Political order involves institutionalizing rela-
tively independent administrative capacities; that is,
the permanent governing institutions that operate rela-
tively independently of pre-existing political institutions
(Matthews, 2012). Huntington (1968) saw autonomy as
a necessary requirement of state-formation. Saint-Simon
(1964, pp. 35–38) also argued that one necessary factor
in building political order is the making of administra-
tive systems that consist of common sets of bureaucratic
bodies, which include a congress that serves the com-
mon interest independently of national governments.
Subsequently, political order at a Nordic level would re-
quire an independent Nordic administrative system with
some organizational capacities of its own. It would re-
quire the existence of independent administrative capac-
ities within and around the Nordic Council of Ministers
as the executive arm of the Nordic Council. The develop-
ment and implementation of public policy froma ‘Nordic’
perspective would require the supply of such indepen-
dent Nordic administrative capacities (Olesen & Strang,
2016). Etzold (2020), however, shows that such level
of administrative independence does not exist at the
Nordic level despite many commonalities and the close
cooperation among its countries. Lacking any suprana-
tional elements, the institutions of Nordic cooperation
are in practice not sufficiently independent.
4.2. Influence
Political order also requires that political institutions be
relatively able to influence decision-making processes
within subordinate institutions of a system. More gen-
erally, the independence and integration of administra-
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tive capacities may not only influence how public pol-
icy is formulated and implemented, it may also affect
the capacity to influence and challenge other institutions
(Ahrne & Brunsson, 2019). Within the EU, the European
Commission has requisite capacities to influence gov-
ernance processes within EU agencies as well as na-
tional agencies, making national agencies ‘double hat-
ted’ serving both as national and EU-level regulatory bod-
ies. Studies suggest that the European Commission has
de facto capacities to influence everyday governing ac-
tivities of domestic agencies—making them in practice
partly European and partly national (Egeberg & Trondal,
2017) as well as making them autonomous vis-à-vis their
parent ministries (Bach, Ruffing, & Yesilkagit, 2015).
However, without requisite independent administra-
tive capacities at its disposal, Nordic cooperation is
largely centered on the cooperative behavior among
member-state agencies. It is fundamentally the discre-
tionary behavior of agency personnel and sub-units
among the Nordic member-states that make up the core
fabric of Nordic administrative cooperation. Lægreid
and Rykkja (2020) and Kjøndal (2020) substantiate that
Nordic cooperation is largely centered on agency-to-
agency cooperation within policy sub-systems. Olesen
and Strang (2016, p. 28) similarly argue that the Nordic
Council of Ministers was largely established on the ba-
sis of pre-existing administrative networks amongNordic
agencies. This has also been illustrated in a case study
of the Norwegian Statistical Agency. Originating in 1889,
Nordic statistical cooperation has largely been centered
on horizontal network cooperation among national reg-
ulatory agencies with a focus on how to develop shared
methodologies, statistical registers and user information.
Agency directors have met regularly, followed by regular
meetings among lower-ranked staff who share common
portfolios. Moreover, these networks andmeetings have
been used to prepare meetings both in Eurostat and in
the Nordic Council (Teigen & Trondal, 2015).
As outlined below, an MLA approach is also an orga-
nizational approach to public governance. From an or-
ganizational theory point of view, the question of how
administrative institutions are organized is thought to af-
fect how they evolve andwork (Egeberg& Trondal, 2018).
The horizontal specialization of administrations and their
sub-units may for example affect how they influence
other institutions. For example, the sector-specialization
of the Secretariat of the Nordic Council of Ministers is
likely to mobilize sector-specialized cooperation among
Nordic ministries and agencies. This may cause the de-
velopment of direct relationships between administra-
tive units of the Nordic Council of Ministers and cor-
responding national agencies, thus generating sectoral
ties between administrative bodies at Nordic and domes-
tic level. Olesen and Strang (2016) show how meetings
among Nordic bureaucrats contribute to developing and
maintaining a ‘Nordic ethos,’ illustrated by themany com-
mon declarations that have been signed among Nordic
countries in certain policy domains.
4.3. Integration
A final characteristic of political order is the extent to
which they are internally integrated and able to act co-
herently. The question is thus how competing patterns of
administrative integration and coordination and disinte-
gration, or fragmentation and siloization, co-exist within
and among institutions. Studies observe that the emer-
gence of common political orders does not necessarily
lead to the rise of coherent and integrated institutions.
Instead, Orren and Skowronek (2004) suggest that dif-
ferent elements of administrative bodies tend to over-
lap, counteract, and be poorly coordinated rather than
coordinated and well ´ordered.’ Studies show that par-
allel to the vertical specialization of administrative sys-
tems, there is a push for administrative coordination and
centralization within national governments, strengthen-
ing the executive branch of government (Poguntke &
Webb, 2005). This pattern is also observed within the
European Commission. Contemporary studies of the
European Commission reveal it has become increasingly
internally coordinated—both between the different lay-
ers of the Commission administration as well as be-
tween the Commission administration and the political
level (College of Commissioners and their cabinets; e.g.,
Kassim, Connolly, Dehousse, Rozenberg, & Benjamballah,
2017). These observations are also reflected through-
out the history of the European Commission with peri-
ods of internal integration and periods of internal dis-
integration. This was illustrated in the Jaques Delors
Commission (1985–1994) which was characterized by
presidential power and a neglect of ordinary adminis-
trative rules and routines (Christiansen, 2008, p. 63).
Kassim et al. (2013) showhow the European Commission
president has gained more organizational capacities, no-
tably by strengthening the Secretariat-General into a po-
litical secretariat for the President. However, Trondal
(2012) also shows parallel processes of administra-
tive siloization and turf wars between departments
(Directorate-Generals) of the European Commission.
In short, political order involves continuous
balancing-acts between and complex co-existences of
integration and disintegration of administrative systems.
However, there are no studies that have empirically
mapped this dimension within the Nordic Council of
Ministers, or adjacent institutions.
5. Conceptual Added Value
With an ambition to argue for a public administration ap-
proach to the study of political order, the conceptual di-
mensions outlined above may serve not only to under-
stand elements of political order, but also to accentu-
ate what makes a public administration approach differ-
ent from its conceptual alternative—the MLG approach.
In short, an MLA approach highlights analytical dimen-
sions that remain largely untouched by MLG literature.
This section operationalizes variations between theMLG
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and theMLA approaches, and also shows how these two
approaches may complement each other. However, the
section does not offer a thorough review of each liter-
ature, which has been provided elsewhere (e.g., Bache
& Flinders, 2004; Bauer & Trondal, 2015; Piattoni, 2010).
Three conceptual differences are discussed in the follow-
ing: (i) Units of analysis; (ii) ideas on organizational differ-
entiation; and essentially (iii) causal mechanisms.
5.1. Units of Analysis
The MLG approach has focused on sub-national author-
ities, or regions, as unit of analysis, and highlighted the
complex actorhood that spans levels of authority in con-
temporary public governance processes (Ongaro, 2015;
Marks, Hooghe, & Schekel, 2008, p. 113; Marks, Nielsen,
& Ray, 1996). This approach focuses on how the author-
ity of regions gives them requisite capacities to by-pass
national governments in their interaction with EU insti-
tutions. Due to the interconnection of political author-
ity across levels of governance, it is argued that the dis-
tinction between domestic and international relations
as well as between domestic and foreign policy admin-
istrations has become obsolete, and as a consequence
regional actors tend to mobilize policy attention beyond
the state (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 4). By contrast,
the MLA approach focuses on the administrative struc-
tures of political order at different levels of government,
notably on the mutual interaction of bureaucratic sub-
units across levels of governance. Empirical studies that
have used the MLA approach have paid attention to the
interaction of administrative sub-units across levels of
governance and how such interaction influences bureau-
cratic autonomy, behavioral logics and administrative
styles among administrative office holders (Bauer et al.,
2019; Egeberg, 2006; Trondal & Peters, 2013). Focus is
thus directed towards how government administrations
´mobilize biases´ in governance processes and systemati-
cally shape administrative behavior among civil servants
(Schattschneider, 1975; Simon, 1965). TheMLAapproach
assumes that how bureaucracies and their sub-units are
organized at all levels of government is likely to system-
atically shape the administrative behavior evoked by bu-
reaucratic staff, and ultimately influence multilevel ad-
ministrative governance processes.
5.2. Organizational Differentiation
Although the MLG approach successfully challenged the
unitary conception of the nation-state, it simultaneously
treated its unit of analysis—regions—as ‘black boxes.’
In short, the operationalization of regional authority
did not include the organizational structuring of sub-
national institutions (Marks et al., 2008, p. 115). As a con-
sequence, Ongaro (2015) criticized the MLG literature
for being a loose umbrella concept rather than a clear-
cut theory. To illustrate, Marks et al. (2008) carefully
measured local authority by the use of nine dimensions.
Along all dimensions, regions were treated as coherent
wholes. Neither of these dimensions suggested how ad-
ministrative characteristics of sub-national institutions
should be conceptualized or applied to a causal model.
As a consequence of an absence of an organizational
(bureaucratic) dimension, the MLG approach focused on
“the allocation of authority across general-purpose juris-
dictions” (Marks et al., 2008, p. 111). One explanation for
this is the rationalist ontology ofMLGwhich treats admin-
istrative institutions as epiphenomena to the interaction
of regions (see Section 5.3).
The MLA approach, by contrast, treats the unit of
analysis as internally differentiated. Echoing the ideas
of institutional polycentrism that studied systems of
interconnected sub-units (Ostrom, 2009), the MLA ap-
proach assumes that politico-administrative institutions
are potentially internally differentiated and that pat-
terns of differentiation systematically influence and bias
multilevel administrative governance processes. Viewing
political orders as organizationally differentiated more-
over implies institutional differentiation and separation
of powers being conceptually and causally important
(Olsen, 2016, p. 8; see next paragraph). Egeberg and
Trondal (2018) suggest how organizational variables can
be applied to unpack organizational differentiations—
such as organizational capacity (high/low), organiza-
tional departmentalization (horizontal/vertical), organi-
zational association (primary/secondary), geographical
locus (integrated/disintegrated), organizational demog-
raphy (e.g., educational background of staff), and orga-
nizational coupling (tight/loose).
Organizational differentiation might take the form
of internal and/or external differentiation. In the con-
Table 1. A conceptual comparison.
Multilevel governance Multilevel administration
Units of analysis Political arenas (e.g., subnational Administrative institutions (public sector organizations
authorities, regions) and their sub-components)
Organizational No differentiation (regions treated Degrees of differentiation (administrative systems are
differentiation as black boxes) organizationally specialized systems)
Causal mechanisms The supply of (regional) authority The supply of organizational routines
Source: Based on Trondal and Bauer (2017).
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text of Nordic cooperation, of particular relevance are
secondary structures established outside and between
primary structures that serve to differentiate the sys-
tem. The primary organizational affiliation of decision-
makers is the unit to which s/he is likely to dedicate
most attention, time and resources. Examples are a min-
isterial department or a regulatory agency. Committees,
collegial bodies and networks, on the other hand, con-
stitute secondary structures, meaning that participants
are expected to be part-timers, having their primary
affiliation somewhere else, e.g., in a department or
agency. Secondary structures—such as administrative
networks of regulatory authorities—organize transac-
tions by bringing together part-time participants in
mutual exchange of information and expertise (Wood,
2019). Studies show that such bodies facilitate interac-
tion, coordination and trust among primary structures
(e.g., Billis & Rochester, 2020; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012;
Lægreid, Randma-Liiv, Rykkja, & Sarapuu, 2016). For ex-
ample, central governments that complement hierar-
chies with horizontal devices (e.g., interdepartmental
committees) seem to be somewhat more coordinated
than those relying entirely on hierarchies (Wegrich &
Stimac, 2014).
5.3. Causal Mechanisms
Finally, the MLG and MLA approaches diverge on core
ontological ideas of causality of public governance.
Although criticized for being a theoretically descrip-
tive concept (e.g., Ongaro, 2015), the essential explana-
tory component of the MLG approach is actor-centered.
Moreover, to the extent that institutional variables are
included in the equation, they are largely applied as ag-
gregative items (Marks et al., 1996, p. 170) and thus
similar to a thin ‘exchange based’ idea of institutions
and human choice (March & Olsen, 1995). According to
an exchange-based theory of politics, March and Olsen
(1995, p. 7) argue that “politics can be seen as aggregat-
ing individual preferences into collective action by pro-
cedures of rational bargaining, negotiation, coalition for-
mation, and exchange.” Institutional variables thus do
not figure as independent variables, but largely as in-
tervening variables that constrain human choices and
policy processes. Based on a rationalist ontology, the
MLG approach has successfully studied the role of sub-
national authority as a local push-factor for MLG (Marks
et al., 2008).
The MLA approach, by contrast, argues that institu-
tions should be treated as independent variables in the
analytical model. The MLA approach thus rests on an
organizational approach. An organizational approach is
grounded on the assumption that organizational charac-
teristics may explain both how organizations act as well
as how they change. An organizational approach in this
study emphasizes howdecision processes and humanbe-
havior respond to a set of fairly stable organizational rou-
tines (Cyert & March, 1963). Essentially, stable premises
for behavioral choices are past experiences encoded in
rules and expressed in the organizational structure of a
government apparatus (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, &
Licari, 2012; Olsen, 2017; Waldo, 1952). Organizational
characteristics of the governmental apparatus systemat-
ically enable and constrain public governance processes,
making some policy choices more likely than others.
A theory of organization is thus also a theory of poli-
tics (Waldo, 1952). Organizational factors focus and mo-
bilize attention and action capacity around certain prob-
lems and solutions while ignoring others, focus attention
along particular lines of conflict and cooperation, and
so on (Simon, 1983, p. 21). An organizational approach
posits that organizational factors are not merely an ex-
pression of symbol politics (Feldman & March, 1981;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but create systematic biases in
human behavior and collective decision processes by di-
recting and nudging individual and collective choices to-
wards certain problems and solutions, thereby making
certain outcomesmore plausible than others (Egeberg &
Trondal, 2020; Fligstein, 2001; Gulick, 1937; Hammond,
1986; Schattschneider, 1975; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).
Contemporary studies in organization theory focus
particularly on the explanatory role of organizational
structure (Egeberg, 2012; Egeberg & Trondal, 2018).
An organizational structure is a normative structure, it
is a decided order, composed of rules and roles specify-
ing who is expected to do what, when and how (Ahrne
& Brunsson, 2019; Egeberg & Trondal, 2018; Scott &
Davis, 2016). It suggests how roles, power and respon-
sibilities are distributed, controlled and coordinated. It
shapes behavior by providing individuals with “a sys-
tematic and predictable selection of problems, solutions
and choice opportunities” (March & Olsen, 1976, p. 13).
While organizational structure does not necessarily pre-
dict or determine actual decision-making behavior, it
does make some choices become more likely than oth-
ers (e.g., Egeberg & Trondal, 2018). As such, organiza-
tion theory builds on decision theory, with its focus on
explaining decision-making behavior (Simon, 1965). This
entails that organizational factors do not impact directly
on society; rather, they have an indirect effect by influ-
encing the policy process and the decisions made within
and outside organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2019).
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1965) is one of three key
mechanisms that connect role expectations to behavior;
the organizational structure helps simplify actors’ cog-
nitive worlds by directing attention towards a selection
of possible problems and solutions, and ways to con-
nect them. This concept holds that decision-makers op-
erate under three restrictions disregarded by the con-
sequentialist theology of economic man limited infor-
mation with regards to possible solutions and alterna-
tives; limited cognitive capacity to evaluate and pro-
cess information; and limited time to make decisions
(March, 2011). Consequently, actors opt for a selection
of satisfactory alternatives instead of optimal ones and
often turn to their immediate environments and avail-
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able knowledge to find proper choices (Simon, 1965).
The second mechanism—the logic of appropriateness—
views human action as driven by internalized percep-
tions of what is deemed appropriate (March & Olsen,
1989). Finally, actors may find that rule and role compli-
ance is in accordance with their self-interests and util-
ity functions. Organizations are thus incentive systems
that administer rewards and punishments (e.g., Ostrom,
Ostrom, Aligica, & Sabetti, 2015; Simon, 1983).
In this regard, the MLA approach builds on an or-
ganizational approach of public governance (Arellano-
Gault, Demortain, Rouillard, & Thoenig, 2013; Egeberg
& Trondal, 2018). One such variable is the organization
of administrative capacities supplied at each level of gov-
ernment. The MLA approach suggests that how such or-
ganizational capacities are distributed in sub-unit levels
at each level of government is likely to influence hu-
man choices and policy processes. Moreover, organiza-
tions at different levels that are structured by competing
principles may provide multiple and competing choice-
architectures for decision-makers,making themaware of
multiple preferences, concerns and considerations dur-
ing the decision-making cycle. Moreover, organizational
capacities provide government institutionswith leverage
to act independently, to enable them some degree of in-
ternal integration, and to make them influential towards
external institutions (see Section 4.2).
6. Conclusions
This article has drawn attention to a public administra-
tion approach to the study of political order. Moreover,
the study suggests how this approach adds value by
outlining an organization theory of public governance.
In sum, the article suggests that a public administration
approach is a necessary, yet often neglected, element in
a general theory of political order. Focusing on the ad-
ministrative dimension of politics, this conceptual frame-
work is also a (partial) theory of political organization.
The empirical laboratories that are available to so-
cial science are likely to bias the theoretical lessons that
are drawn. As the discipline of public administration has
been largely locked in national laboratories, the theo-
retical apparatus available to understand the administra-
tive dimension of Nordic cooperation in particular, and
European (multilevel) integration in general, is limited.
As a consequence, the sub-discipline of public admin-
istration in political science has paid scarce attention
to how administrative systems are essential ingredients
to (Nordic) political order. This article aims to capture
the administrative dimension of (Nordic) political order
along three conceptual dimensions: institutional inde-
pendence, integration, and influence. These dimensions
serve to accentuate what makes a public administration
lens valuable as well as the organizational dimension of
such processes important. Due to organizational differ-
entiation of government apparatuses (cf. Section 5.2),
administrative cooperation among Nordic ministries and
agencies are likely to follow sectoral lines (Kjøndal, 2020;
Teigen & Trondal, 2015).
A public administration approach is more generally
helpful for studying the consolidation of embryonic polit-
ical orders. According toMarch and Olsen (1995), organi-
zations and organized systems are merely temporary sys-
tems of rules and roles, and according to Rokkan (1999)
they are provisional resolutions of societal conflicts.
A public administration approach to the study of politi-
cal order helps to capture how emergent political orders
that span multiple tiers of authoritative decision-making
are dependent on certain administrative resources. This
article, however, suggests that Nordic-level institutions
are less likely to act relatively integrated and indepen-
dently of member-state governments and less likely to
wield significant influence on public governance pro-
cesses within member-state institutions. In the case of
Nordic cooperation, most primary administrative capac-
ities are located within national ministries and agencies,
and relatively few at the ‘Nordic level.’ Member-state ad-
ministrations are subsequently likely to primarily influ-
ence policy agendas and policy implementation.
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